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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public choice theory has long proclaimed that business interests can 
capture regulatory processes to generate economic rents at the expense of 
consumers.' Such political exploitation may go unnoticed and unchallenged 
for long time periods because, though the rents are captured by a relatively 
small number of individuals or firms, the costs are widely diffused over a large 
number of consumers.2 The triggering event to expose and mobilize 
opposition to the regulatory capture may not arise until a new technology 
seeks to challenge the incumbent technology, thus creating a motivated 
champion to expose and oppose the regulatory capture and advocate for 
regulatory liberalization. 
That moment has arrived in the automobile industry. Since the 1950s, 
the distribution of automobiles has been pervasively regulated by a patchwork 
of state laws promulgated at the insistence of dealers for the ostensible 
purpose of preventing unfair exploitation by franchising car manufacturers.3 
Among other things, the dealer laws in many states prohibit a manufacturer 
from opening its own showrooms or service centers-from dealing directly 
with consumers.4 At the time these direct distribution prohibitions were 
enacted, the Big Three auto manufacturers (Ford, General Motors, and 
Chrysler) completely dominated the U.S. car market, and the dealers argued 
I. See, e.g. , KENNETH ]. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) ;  
JAMES M .  BUCHANAN & CORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Charles K. Rowley ed., Liberty Fund 2004) ( 1 962) ;  ANTHONY 
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY ( 1957) ; MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS ( 1965). 
2. James D. Gwarmey & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Refrresentative 
Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3, 11-12 Qames D. Gwartney & 
Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988) (describing "rational ignorance"); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS 
AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS go ( 1 981) (arguing that concentrated 
interests are more likely to generate political and lobbying activity by organized groups than when 
interests are diffuse) ; Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 367 
( 1988) .  See generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19].L. & ECON. 2 11 
( 1 976). 
3 .  Jessica Higashiyama, State Automobile Dealer Franchise Laws: Have They Become the 
Proverbial Snake in the Grass? 2 -4 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) , http://ssm.com/ 
abstract= 1394877. 
4. Id. at 12 . 
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that they were unable to contractually protect themselves against a franchising 
manufacturer unfairly undermining its own franchised dealers at retail.5 
Though the U.S. auto market has become considerably more competitive 
since the direct distribution prohibitions were enacted, hence diminishing 
any power the manufacturers might have to impose draconian contractual 
terms, the laws have persisted largely without modification. 
The challenge to the status quo has come from the abrupt market entry 
of a redoubtable technological challenger to the internal combustion status 
quo. In 201 2, Palo Alto, California-based Tesla Motors began selling all­
electric vehicles. Tesla, the offspring of entrepreneur Elon Musk-who also 
created the online payment service PayPal and the space exploration 
company SpaceX-quickly won accolades for its disruptive technology. 
Consumer Reports went so far as to call the Tesla Model S the best performing 
car of any kind it had ever tested.6 Yet Tesla's greatest market entry challenge 
has not been solving the technological problems of creating a battery than 
can run for nearly the fuel range of a typical car or the battery swapping and 
supercharging infrastructure necessary to grant Tesla drivers recharging 
access comparable to filling stations. Rather, its greatest challenge has been 
to obtain the legal right to distribute its cars directly to consumers and to 
provide aftermarket service to Tesla owners. Across the country, the car 
dealers' lobby-often with the support of the legacy car companies-has 
invoked either the old dealer laws or obtained legislative extensions of them 
to block Tesla's progress. Tesla is fighting a multi-state, multi-front battle in 
state legislatures, regulatory commissions, and courts just for the right to 
distribute and service its products. 
The Tesla story is important on its own terms because of its implications 
for innovation in the automotive industry, the dissemination of 
environmentally friendly technologies, and energy independence. But it is 
also emblematic of a broader problem of economic regulation and frail legal 
response-the lack of robust legal tools for the courts to tackle protectionist 
or otherwise anti-consumer regulations designed solely to benefit 
concentrated economic interests. In the post-Lochner era, courts have been 
reluctant to subject protectionist state regulatory schemes to intrusive judicial 
review under any legal framework-whether antitrust law, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, Substantive Due Process, or Equal Protection. Only 
recently have a few federal courts begun to show some willingness to invalidate 
the most egregiously anti-competitive state regulatory schemes as instances of 
5. Id. at 1-4. 
6. Vuieos: Cars, CONSUMER REPORTS, http:/ /www.consumerreports.org/ cm/video-hub/ cars/ 
hybrids-alternative-fuel/tesla-model-s-201 3201 5-<juick.<frive/ 1 4786539001/236624088200 1 (last 
visited Nov. 1 4, 2015) ("The Tesla Model S electric car is the best performing car ever tested by 
Consumer Reports.") .  
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naked economic· protectionism that fail even rational basis review.7 In most 
such instances, the political process remains the consumer's sole recourse­
with the dreary prospects for political relief that public choice theory suggests. 
This Article examines the Tesla wars as a case study in state economic 
protectionism and crony capitalism that lay largely unchallenged for decades 
until a maverick technology appeared in the market and began radically to 
disrupt the status quo. It is a case study that bolsters the conventional public 
choice story of capture and rent extraction, but extends it with further 
observations about the potential of political capture to injure consumer 
interests not only statically through higher prices but also dynamically 
through the protection of incumbent technologies against replacement by 
new and innovative technologies. And it is a story about the inadequacy of 
judicial review, in most of its prevailing flavors, to do much about it. 
But if the Tesla story highlights the inadequacy of law to address most 
instances of special interest barrier erection through capture of the political 
process, it also showcases the potential for a new strand of anti-crony­
capitalism politics. The direct distribution battle coincides with other high­
profile conflicts between incumbent technologies protected by long­
unchallenged laws and new technologies seeking to penetrate the market. 
Consider, for example, the ongoing battles between the taxi establishment 
and ride-sharing services Uber and Lyft.8 The confrontation between 
incumbent and innovative technologies is shaking up traditional political 
juxtapositions, such as business versus consumer or free market versus 
environmentalist, and inspiring strange bedfellow coalitions. Over time, the 
patterns observed in the Tesla wars could contribute to a fundamental 
realignment of political coalitions on issues of protectionism and economic 
regulation. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II details the anatomy of dealer 
protectionism, briefly summarizing the history of American dealer franchise 
laws, introducing Tesla's business model, and recounting the highlights of the 
Tesla wars to date. Part III analyzes the policy arguments over laws prohibiting 
direct distribution. It shows that none of the contemporary arguments against 
direct distribution are remotely sustainable and that laws prohibiting direct 
distribution can be explained only as capitulation to the dealers' demands for 
protection from competition. Finally, Part IV considers the law and politics of 
the Tesla wars. Still treading in the long shadows of Lochner, the legal doctrines 
most related to invalidating purely protectionist laws-antitrust law, the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause-are of relatively little help in combating 
7. See generally Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with &anomic Bite, 8 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTI 1 055, 1058 (20 1 4 ) .  
8 .  See, e.g., Melissa Sachs, On the Ro ad  to $40 Billion, Ridesharing App Uber Hit Uy Lawsuits, 
Regulators, THOMSON RElJTERS: KNOWLEDGE EFFECT (Dec. 1 7, 2014), http://blog.thomsonreuters. 
com/ index. php I on-the-road-to-40-billion-ridesharing-app-uber-hi t-by-lawsui ts-regulators. 
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economic protectionism. However, confrontation between innovation and 
establishment may create a new political vocabulary and consciousness and 
awaken a rising class of younger, technology-intensive voters to an old public 
choice story. 
II. THE ANATOl\1Y OF DEALER PROTECTIONISM 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEALER FRANCHISE LAWS 
Automotive manufacturer franchising of dealers began in 1 898 with a 
franchise by General Motors to sell steam automobiles.9 However, for the first 
few decades of the 20th century, manufacturers employed a wide variety of 
distribution methods, including dealer franchising, direct distribution 
through factory-owned stores and traveling salesmen, and distribution 
through wholesalers, retail department stores, and consignment 
arrangements . 10 Dealer franchising was not the early predominant model. As 
automobile consumption intensified, however, the manufacturers found it 
necessary to move increasingly to a franchise model in order to focus on their 
core competency in manufacturing and find additional sources of capital to 
fund their distribution operations. 1 1  
The dealer-franchise system with which we are accustomed today grew 
out of intensive lobbying efforts by car dealers from the 1 930s to the 1 950s in 
response to perceived abuses of the franchise relationship by car 
manufacturers. 1 2 At that time, the car companies were large, powerful, and 
few in number-the Big Three dominated the market. Dealers were largely 
"mom and pop" shops, organized on a small scale. 1 3  Manufacturers were able 
to secure contracts that imposed draconian terms on the dealers. 11 For 
example, during the Depression,  Henry Ford kept his factories running at 
"full tilt" and allegedly was able to "force" dealers to buy inventories of Model 
Ts that they would be unable to sell, under threat of not getting any more 
9. Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton, Markets: State Franchise Laws, Dealer 
Terminations, and the Auto Crisis, 24J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 234 (2010) .  
10. Thomas G. Marx, The Development of the Franchise Distribution System in the U.S. Automobile 
Industry, 59 Bus. HIST. REV. 465, 465-66 ( 1 985); see also Gary Michael Brown, Note, State Motor 
Vehicle Franchise Legislation: A Survey and Due Process Challenge to Board Composition, 33 V AND. L. REV. 
385, 387 ( 1980).  
1 1 . Brown, supra note 10, at 387. 
1 2 . See Higashiyama, supra note 3, at 11. 
13. See STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF PmVER: THE AUTOMOBILE 
MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 5-1 2 ( 1 966). 
14. See Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration l7y Contract, 66 YALE 
LJ. 11 35, 1 1 55 (1957) ( describing automotive franchise contracts as quintessential contracts of  
adhesion) .  See generally CHARLES MAsON HEWITT, JR., AUTOMOBILE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 2 3-40 
( 1956) ; BED ROS PETER PASHIGIAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILES, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM ( 1961 ) . 
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inventory in the future if they refused delivery.'5 According to a 1 956 Senate 
Committee report, franchise agreements of the 1 950s typically did not 
require the manufacturer to supply the dealer with any inventory and allowed 
the manufacturer to terminate the franchise relationship at will without any 
showing of cause. 16 Conversely, as with the Ford example, the manufacturers 
could often force dealerships to accept cars whether the dealer could sell 
them or not. '7 Thus, the franchise agreements were perceived as shifting risk 
downward to dealers and reward upwards to the manufacturers. 
The dealers made some headway in the courts challenging the franchise 
agreements as contracts of adhesion. 1s But the relief they ultimately needed 
was legislative. During the 1 930s to 1 950s, the dealers pressured Congress to 
enact a statutory scheme protecting them from the power of the Big Three. 
They obtained relatively little of what they wanted from the federal 
government. A I 939 report by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which 
had been encouraged by the car dealers, did find some franchising abuses by 
manufacturers, but one of the report's headlines was that the use of 
manufacturer power to squeeze the dealers actually created intensive retail 
competition to the benefit of consumers. '9  The FTC also turned the tables on 
the dealers and accused them of various anticompetitive or anti-consumer 
practices, such as "padding" new car prices, price fixing, and "packing" 
finance charges-not the news the dealers wanted.20 Eventually, the dealers 
secured a modest federal victory with the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court 
Act of 1 956, which allows dealers to bring a federal suit against a 
manufacturer who, without good faith, fails to comply with the terms of a 
franchise agreement or terminates, cancels, or refuses to renew a franchise.2 1 
The dealers secured more significant victories in state legislatures. 
During the same time period, states began to pass statutes governing 
automotive franchise relations.•• Today, such laws are on the books in all 50 
states.•3 Their terms vary, but they commonly include prohibitions on forcing 
dealers to accept unwanted cars, protections against termination of franchise 
1 5 . James Surowiecki, Dealer's Choice, NEW YORKER (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.newyorker. 
com/ magazine/ 2006/ 09/ 04/ dealers-choice-2 . 
1 6. See S. REP. No. 2073, at 3 ( 1 956). 
1 7. Id. at 2 .  
1 8 .  Higashiyama, supra note 3,  a t  4-5. 
1 9. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1 939, at 24-25 ( 1 939), https:/ /www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/ reports_annual/ annual-report-1 939/ ar 1 939_0. pdf. 
20. Id. 
2 1 .  1 5  U.S.C. § 1 2 2 2  (201 2). Seegimerally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 ( 1 985); Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act of 1 956, Pub. L. No. 84-1 026, 70 
Stat. 1 1 25. 
2 2 .  Higashiyama, supra note 3,  at  1 3 .  
2 3 .  Id. a t  1 1 . 
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agreements, and restrictions on granting additional franchises in a franchised 
dealer's geographic market area.24 
The statutory provisions of difficulty to Tesla prohibit a manufacturer 
from distributing its cars directly to consumers, effectively requiring the 
manufacturer to deal exclusively through dealers.•5 The legislative concern 
reflected in these statutes is that if a manufacturer integrated foiward into 
distribution, it might compete unfairly with its own franchised dealers by 
undercutting them on price.•6 For example, the legislative history of the 
Michigan statute reveals that the statute was designed to address "the unequal 
power balance between dealers and manufacturers [ that] leaves a great 
potential for arbitrary and unilateral decisions by manufacturers about 
contract arrangements"•1 in part by forbidding manufacturers "to compete 
with franchised dealers by offering the same services."2s 
What is important to note for present purposes is that the direct 
distribution prohibitions were expressly justified as part of a package of 
protections for dealers against the exercise of superior manufacturer 
bargaining power. Manufacturers were assumed to pursue franchisee 
relationships-since the Big Three all did-and pure direct distribution was 
not considered or discussed. Further, contrary to current efforts by the dealers 
to frame these direct distribution prohibitions as consumer protection 
measures (discussed in Part III infra) ,  there is not a whiff of consumer 
protection sentiment in these statutes. They were all about protecting dealers 
in franchise relationships from the exigencies of superior manufacturer 
bargaining power. 
B. TESLA 's DIRECT DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY 
The introduction of new products or technologies that compete against 
incumbent technologies often requires new methods of distribution. 
Examples include "new world" wine companies that bypassed the long, 
multilevel value chains used by the old world companies and distributed their 
products through tightly controlled full-value distribution chains,29 and early 
decisions by Dell and Gateway computers to compete against established 
personal computer manufacturers by pursuing exclusive built-to-order, direct-
24. Id. at 1 2 .  
25. Cynthia Barmore, Tesla Unplugged: Automobile Franchise Laws and the Threat to the Electric 
Vehicle Market, 1 8  VA.J.L. & TECH. 1 85, 1 89 (20 1 4) . 
26. Id. at 202. 
27 .  MICH. H. LEGIS. A i"IALYSIS SECTION, SECOND ANALYSIS, H.B. 4738, 4740, at I ( 1-26-gg), 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/ 1 997-1 998/billanalysis/House/pdf/ 1 997-HIA-4738-
B.pdf. 
28.  MICH. H. LEGIS. ANALYSIS SECTION, H.B. 5072 SYNOPSIS (7-25-77) .  
29. Christopher A. Bartlett, Global Wine War 2009: New World Versus Old 5 (Harvard Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. g-g 10-405, 2009). 
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to-consumer models.3° There is often an important relationship between 
product innovation and innovation in distribution. Incumbent technologies 
often have a grip on established distribution channels through embedded 
relationships, quasi-exclusive dealing arrangements, and settled customer 
expectations, which requires proponents of new technologies to locate or 
create new channels of market access. 
When Tesla entered the market, it announced that it would not employ 
traditional dealer networks but rather open its own showrooms and sell 
directly to consumers and service their cars in aftermarkets. It explained its 
decision as necessary to ensuring the acceptance of electric vehicle ("EV") 
technology. In a blog post, Elon Musk explained that "[e]xisting franchise 
dealers have a fundamental conflict of interest between selling gasoline cars, 
which constitute the vast majority of their business, and selling the new 
technology of electric cars."3' He argued that "[i ] t  is impossible for 
[traditional dealers] to explain the advantages of going electric without 
simultaneously undermining their traditional business. This would leave the 
electric car without a fair opportunity to make its case to an unfamiliar 
public."32 
A 2014 study conducted by Consumer Reports bolsters Musk's claims.33 
Consumer Repmts sent 1 9 secret shoppers to 8 5 dealerships in 4 states, making 
anonymous visits to showrooms that stocked at least some electric cars 
between December 2013  and March 2014.34 The shoppers asked salespeople 
a variety of questions concerning electric cars, such as about the availability of 
"tax breaks and other incentives, vehicle charge time, cost, and options, 
vehicle range, and battery life and warranty."3s While Consumer Repmts 
encountered "several" well-informed sales people, most were dismally 
ignorant about electrical vehicles: "few provided accurate and specific answers 
about battery life and battery warranties. And many seemed not to have a good 
understanding of electric-car tax breaks and other incentives or of charging 
needs and costs."36 Thirteen out of the 85 dealers actively discouraged the 
purchase of an electrical vehicle, and 35 out of the 85 recommended buying 
30. Case Study: Dell-Distribution and Supply Chain Innovation, MARS DISCOVERY DISTRICT 
(Feb. 8, 201  1 ) ,  http:/ /www.marsdd.com/mars-library /case-study-dell-distribution-and-supply­
chain-innovation; Brian Osborne, Gateway Moves to Ioo % Indirect Distribution, GEEK Ouly 28, 2008, 
2:01 PM), http:/ /www.geek.com/ chips/ gateway-moves-to-1 oo-indirect-distribution-576848. 
3i. Elon Musk, The Tesla Approach to Distributing and Servicing Cars, TESLA: BLOG (Oct. 22 ,  
201 2),  http:/ /www.teslamotors.com/blog/tesla-approach-distributing-and-servicing-cars. 
32 .  Id. 
33. Eric Evarts, Dealers Not Always Plugged in About Electric Cars, Consumer Reports ' Study Reveals, 
CONSUMER REPORTS (Apr. 22,  2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/ 
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a conventional internal combustion vehicle instead.37 Consumer Reports 
concluded with some advice for customers interested in EVs: " [D]o your 
homework and don't rely on the dealership for education about this 
intriguing technology."38 
It is not hard to understand why established dealers prefer to steer buyers 
toward internal combustion vehicles even if they carry some electric vehicles 
in stock. Electric vehicles require considerably less service than do internal 
combustion vehicles. There are no spark plugs, oil, or filters to change, many 
software updates are downloaded automatically from the manufacturer, and 
self-reported diagnostic tools allow for less prophylactic service.39 Dealers earn 
considerably higher margins on service than they do on new vehicle sales,4° 
so the sale of an EV entails foregoing a lucrative future income stream. 
Although most of the recent media coverage has concerned Tesla, other 
recent new entrants into automotive production have also been impacted by 
the American distribution system. In 201 1 ,  Fisker Automotive, a company 
based in Finland, introduced a much-hyped electric car that quickly had 
orders from prominent names in Hollywood and Silicon Valley.4• The 
company failed and went into bankruptcy in 201 2  after being plagued by 
production and financing problems.42 Unlike Tesla, Fisker announced that it 
would distribute its vehicles conventionally-through independent dealers.43 
But, though independent, the dealers Fisker secured were mostly established 
dealership networks.44 Since Fisker sold so few cars before going out of 
business, there are insufficient data to test whether its dealer distribution 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Mike Buchanan, Tesla to Continue Transforming the Automotive Industry, This Time with 
Seroice, INSIDE EVs, http:/ /www.insideevs.com/tesla-to-continue-transforming-the-automotive­
industry-this-time-with-service (last visited Nov. 1 4, 201 5) ;  Nikki Gordon-Bloomfield, 20I2 Tesla 
Model S Seroicing: When, Where, How Much, GREEN CAR REP. (Sept. 1 1 ,  201 2 ) ,  http:/ /www.greencar 
reports.com/ news/ 1 079070_201 2-tesla-model-s-servicing-when-where-how-m uch. 
40. Jim Henry, The SU7prising Ways Car Dealers Make the Most Money off You, FORBES: AUTOS 
(Feb. 29, 201 2, 3: 19 PM) , http:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/jimhenry/20 1 2/ 02/ 29/the-surprising­
ways-<:ar-<lealers-make-the-most-money-off-of-you. 
4 1 .  Katie Fehrenbacher, A Look Under the Hood: "Why Electric Car Startup Fisher Crashed and 
Burned, GIGAOM (Apr. 1 7, 20 13 ,  5:29 PM) , https:/ I gigaom.com/ 201 3/o4/ 1 7  /a-look-under-the­
hood-why-electric-<:ar-startup-fisker-<:rashed-and-burned; Deepa Seetharaman & Paul Lienert, 
Special Report: Bad Karma: How Fisher Burned Through $z.4 Billion on a 'Green' Car, REUTERS (June 
1 7, 2013, 1 :58 AM), http:/ /www.reuters.com/article/ 201 3/06/ 1 7  /us-autos-fisker-specialrepon­
idUSBRE95Go2L201 306 1 7. 
42. Seetharaman & Lienert, supra note 4 1 .  
43. Darryl Siry, Fisher Makes a Safe Bet on Distribution, WIRED: GEAR (Nov. 5, 2009, 8:30 AM), 
http:/ /www.wired.com/ 2009/ 1 1 /fisker-makes-a-safe-bet-on-<listribution. 
44. Fisher Recruits First US Dealers for PHEVs; Appoints First Distributors for EurofJe, GREEN CAR 
CONGRESS (Mar. 26, 2009) ,  http://www.greencarcongress.com/2009/03/fisker-recruits-first-us­
dealers-for-phevs-appoints-first-<listributors-for-europe.html. 
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model could have been successful. Tesla, however, believes that Fisker failed 
in part due to its decision to distribute through traditional dealer networks.45 
Another new entrant into automotive manufacturing offers additional 
color to the story. Elio, an American start-up company based in Phoenix, 
Arizona, is in the process of mass-producing a three-wheeled internal 
combustion vehicle that it says will sell for $6800 and achieve 84 miles per 
gallon on the highway.46 On its website, Elio proclaims that it plans to open 
its own showrooms and pursue a direct distribution model.47 Unless Tesla 
clears the way, Elio will find itself unable to open its own showrooms as it plans 
in most states, and will have to scramble to find dealers willing to distribute its 
vehicles. 
Even Tesla realizes that it may eventually need to pursue a dual 
distribution model, with some company-owned stores and some distribution 
through independent retailers-a strategy similar to that pursued by Apple. 
At upwards of $10,000, the first-generation Tesla is an expensive vehicle 
produced and distributed on a small scale. However, after introducing a small­
scale second-generation vehicle (an SUV), Tesla plans to bring out its third­
generation vehicle on a much larger scale and at a much lower price with the 
contribution of a planned battery "gigafactory" being built near Reno, 
Nevada.48 Once that happens, Tesla sales may reach a scale where exclusive 
distribution through company-owned stores may no longer be viable. Musk 
has hinted that it may need to add franchised dealers down the pike.49 
C. THE TEsLA WARS 
As of this writing, the Tesla Wars are in full motion, so this brief account 
will serve as a mid-stream introduction rather than a historical retrospective. 
Still, the two years of skirmishing to date provide an adequate basis to identify 
the emergence of themes illustrative of the familiar political capture story. 
45. Ben Popper, Auto Dealers Fire Back at Tesla CEO: 'This Musk Guy, He Wants All the Profits 
for Himself, ' VERGE (Mar. 1 9, 2014, 1 1 : 1 3  AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/3/ 1 9/55255 
44/newjersey-auto-dealers-respond-to-teslas-elon-musk (reporting that Tesla CEO Elon Musk 
attributed Fisker's failure to its decision to use established dealers). 
46. Say Hello to Elio. The Ultra-High-Mileage, Sleek Two-Seater for an Incredibly Affordahle Base Price. 
Coming Fourth Quarter 2016!, Euo MOTORS, http:/ /www.eliomotors.com (last visited Nov. 14, 201 5) .  
47. Are Dealerships Available t o  Purchase?, ELIO MOTORS, https://eliomotors.zendesk.com/ 
he/ en-us/articles/ 203014  734-Are-dealerships-available-to-purchase- ( last visited Nov. 14, 201 5) 
("Elio Motors will not be selling franchises or dealerships. Our plan is  to open 1 20 company 
owned retail centers in the top sixty markets in the US." ) .  
48 .  Sharon Bernstein,  Tesla's Massive Battery Factory Could Make Nevada the 'Richest Place on 
Earth Again,' Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 2, 20 14, 3:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-tesla­
factory-near-reno-is-bet-<>id-nevada-will-meet-the-new-20 1 4- 1  o. 
49. Sebastian Blanco, Elon Musk Hints at Need for Franchised Tesla Dealerships, AUTOBLOG 
(Oct. 1 5, 20 1 4, 5:00 PM) ,  http:/ /www.amoblog.com/ 2014/ 1 o/ 1 5/ elon-musk-hints-at-need-for­
franchised-tesla-dealerships. 
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1 .  A Potpourri of Laws, Compromises, and Gamesmanship 
When Tesla hit the market in 2 0 1 2  and began preparations to open 
company-owned showrooms and service centers in various states, the car 
dealers' lobby reacted with alarm and sprang into action.5° The dealers 
argued that direct distribution was prohibited under the existing laws and that 
there should be one set of rules for all car manufacturers. As noted earlier, 
however, the 5os-era prohibitions on direct distribution by manufacturers 
were justified on the assertion that manufacturers might unfairly undercut 
their own franchisees if allowed to open company-owned stores, and the 
relevant statutes were written with that concern in mind.51 Tesla and the 
dealers quickly converged on the defining issue regarding the incumbent 
statutes-are statutes written to protect dealers against overweening 
manufacturer power applicable to companies that employ pure direct 
distribution (i.e. ,  do not use dealers at all)? The results thus far have been a 
potpourri of inertia-driven stalemates, compromises, and shady 
gamesmanship by the car dealers. 
As with much of the law, inertia is proving to be a powerful force on direct 
distribution. In some states, Tesla has found sufficient wiggle room in the 
existing law to open company stores, largely on the argument that the law is 
inapplicable to pure direct distribution. In such states, for example Missouri 
and Minnesota, the car dealers have agitated for new legislation that would 
make the direct distribution ban applicable to pure direct distribution as well, 
thus far without success.52 In North Carolina, the car dealers proposed 
legislation strengthening the existing North Carolina statute to prohibit pure 
direct distribution, but lost after Tesla took the governor and Speaker of the 
House for test drives in a Tesla.53 In Georgia, the car dealers have filed a 
petition with the Georgia Department of Revenue, arguing Tesla's direct sales 
model violates Georgia law.54 As of this writing, Tesla has moved to dismiss the 
50. Throughout this Article, I will refer generally to the "dealers" as a unified and 
homogenous group. This is not entirely fair, since some dealers have supported Tesla's fight for 
direct distribution. See Jerry Hirsch, "Why AutoNation CE O  Jackson Calls Dealer Fight with Tesla 
Hypocritical, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 20 1 4, 1 : 1 8  PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi­
hy-why-autonation-calls-tesla-fight-hypocritical-20 1 4 1 1 20-story. html. 
5 1 .  See supra text accompanying notes 3-5. 
52. Steve Alexander, Minnesota Sales of Electric, Gas Cars Collide, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 1 3 , 20 1 3, 
T 1 3  AM) ,  http:/ /www.startribune.com/minnesota-sales-of-electric-gas-cars-collide/ 197706621 ; 
Lindsay Toler, Tesla Remains Legal in Missouri, Legislature to Reconsider Ban Next Year, RIVERFRONT 
TIMES (May 1 9, 20 14, S:oo AM) ,  http://www.riverfronttimes.com /newsblog/20 14/05/1 9 /tesla­
remains-legal-in-missouri-legislature-to-reconsider-ban-next-year. 
53. James Ayre, Tesla Motors Conquers North Carolina, CLEANTECHNICA (June 30, 20 1 3) ,  
http:/ I cleantechnica.com/ 201 3/ 06/ 30/tesla-motors-conquers-north-carolina. 
54. Urvaksh Karkaria, Tesla Motors Seeks to Dismiss Georgia Dealers' Petition to Ban Tesla Sales, 
ATLANTA Bus. CHRON. (Nov. 1 1 , 2014,  5:04 PM) , http://www.bizjoumals.com/atlanta/blog/ 
atlantech/ 20 1 4/ 1 1  /tesla-motors-seeks-to-dismiss-georgia-dealers.html. 
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petition, arguing that the Georgia law does not apply to pure direct 
distribution.55 
In other states, inertia has favored the dealers. In West Virginia56 and 
Arizona,s7 for example, Tesla has sought legislation that would permit some 
direct distribution, but has thus far come up short. In some cases, the existing 
laws have been interpreted to prohibit almost any marketing activity by Tesla. 
Under the prevailing interpretation of Texas law, Tesla cannot open 
dealerships or service centers in the state, but may showcase its cars at galleries 
in malls.s8 Tesla employees in the galleries-we dare not call them 
salespeople-can show the cars and discuss their technology, but may not 
even quote a price.59 In September of 2014, the Iowa Department of 
Transportation ordered Tesla to halt its plans for three days of test drives in 
the state, stating that Tesla could not operate in the state except through 
franchised dealers.60 Tesla owners in Minnesota reacted by driving into Iowa 
to showcase their cars to prospective buyers.61 
In a number of states, Tesla and the car dealers have reached agreements 
on compromise legislation allowing Tesla a fixed number of stores in the state: 
New Jersey (four dealerships),62 Ohio (three dealerships),63 and Pennsylvania 
(five dealerships) .64 The exemption statutes are typically limited to electric 
vehicle companies or companies that use pure direct distribution in order to 
prevent traditional car companies from taking advantage and opening 
55· Id. 
56. Laura Reston, Tesla Not Gaining Much Traction in W Va., CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL 
(Aug. 10, 201 3) ,  http:/ /www.wvgazette.com/News/ 201 308090064 (reporting that Tesla faces 
substantial obstacles to legislation allowing it to sell direct to consumers in West Virginia). 
57.  Mike Sunnucks, Tesla Bill on Auto Saks Dead at Arizona Legislature, PHX. Bus.J. (Apr. 1 1 , 
20 1 4, 1 :33 PM) , http:/ /www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/ 201 4/04/ 1 I /tesla-bill-on-auto­
sales-dead-at-arizona.html. 
58. Kathleen Burke, Tesla Sets Up ShofJ in Dallas-Minus Test-Drives and Saks, AUTOMOTIVE 
NEWS Oune 1 9 ,  2014, 4: 1 2  PM) , http://www.autonews.com/article/201406 1 9/RETAIL07/ 1 40 
6 1 98 3 6 / tesla-sets-u p-shop-in-dallas-m in us-test-drives-and-sales. 
59· Id. 
60. Joel Aschbrenner, Tesla Test Drives Hit Roadblock in Iowa, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 20 14, 4:44 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ story I money/ cars/ 201 4/ 09/ 24/ tesla-test-driveS<ut-iihort-in-iowa/ 
1 6 1 83133. 
6 1 .  John Voelcker, Minnesota Tesla Owners Show Banned Model S to Iowa Ekctric-Car Shappers, 
GREEN CAR REP. (Oct. 27, 2014) ,  http:/ /www.greencarreports.com/news/ 1 095 1 24_minnesota­
tesla-owners-show-banned-model-s-to-iowa-electric-car-shoppers. 
62. Mike Ramsey, New jersey Assembly Passes Bill Allowing Tesla Saks: Legislation Still Needs 
Approvalb-ySenate and Governor, WALL STREET]. Qune 1 7, 2014, 1 2 : 1 6  PM) ,  http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/newjersey-assembly-passes-bill-allowing-tesla-iiales-1 40302 1 78 1 .  
63. Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Senate OKs Compromise to Allow 3 Tesla Motors Stores in Ohio, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 1 ,  2014, 4: 1 1  PM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/ 
04/ohio_senate_oks_compromise_to.html. 
6+ John Beltz Snyder, Tesla Gets Legal G<rAhead to Sell EVs in Pennsylvania, AUTO BLOG (Aug. 
1 1 ,  2014, 6:29 PM) ,  http:/ /www.autoblog.com/ 20 14/ 08/ 1 1  /tesla-gets-legal-go-ahead-to-sell-evs­
in-pennsylvania. 
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company-owned stores. The Washington compromise legislation goes further 
and makes a one-time Tesla exception.6s It provides that a manufacturer that 
had an existing dealer license as of January i, 2 0 1 4  and distributed only 
vehicles of its own brand and did not distribute at all through franchised 
dealers may distribute directly in Washington.66 This effectively means that 
other future new market entrants will be prohibited from pursuing direct 
distribution unless they can cut their own legislative deals. 67 
With some exceptions, both Tesla and the car dealers seem reluctant to 
take their battles to court, preferring to play smaller stakes games before 
legislatures and regulatory commissions. Both sides appear to be concerned 
about the widespread precedential and "winner takes all" effects that judicial 
decisions might have. Although Tesla has publicly argued that direct 
distribution bans are unconstitutional,68 it has not filed a lawsuit challenging 
their constitutionality. The dealers have brought some legal challenges, but 
have thus far lost in court on judicial interpretations of the relevant statutes, 
favoring Tesla's arguments that the statutes should not be read to apply to 
pure direct distribution. 
The dealers' weaknesses in court seem to have motivated them to pursue 
legislative protection even more vigorously and, in some cases, nefariously. 
Judicial outcomes in New York and Massachusetts, as well as legislative action 
in Michigan in 201 4, showcase these strategic interactions. The principal legal 
thorn in the dealers' side has been standing to sue, which often entails a 
shallow analysis of the underlying substantive issue.69 In New York and 
Massachusetts, the courts dismissed the dealers' challenges to Tesla's opening 
of showrooms in those states, finding that the laws intended to protect dealers 
in franchise relationships did not entitle the dealers to bring lawsuits against 
65. Andrew Thurlow, Washington Governor Signs Tesla Compromise Bill, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS 
(Apr. 8, 2014, 6:09 PM) ,  http:/ /www.autonews.com/article/ 201 40408/RETAIL07 I 1 40409 
83 7 /washington-govemor-signs-tesla-com promise-bill. 
66. WASH. REV. CODE §  46.96. 1 85 ( 1 ) (g) (vii) (20 1 4) (exempting " [a] manufacturer that 
held a vehicle dealer license in this state on January 1 ,  2014, to own, operate, or control a new 
motor vehicle dealership that sells new vehicles that are only of that manufacturer's makes or 
lines and that are not sold new by a licensed independent franchise dealer, or to own, operate, 
or control or contract with companies that provide finance, leasing, or service for vehicles that 
are of that manufacturer's makes or lines") .  
67. I n  another compromise, the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles allowed Tesla to 
apply for a single dealership license. Jonathan O'Connell, Tesla Eyes First Va. Dealership on Tyco 
Road in Tysons, WASH. POST (May 30, 201 4). http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/digger/ 
wp/ 2014/ 05/ 30 / tesla-eyes-first-va-dealership-on-tyco-road-in-tysons. 
68. Tiffany Kaiser, Tesla CEO Elon Musk Willing to Take Auto Dealer Fight to Federal Level, 
DAILYfECH (Apr. 1 6, 201 3, 1 2 : 1 3  PM), http:/ /www.dailytech.com/Tesla+CEO+Elon+Musk+ 
Willing+ to+ Take+Auto+Dealer+Fight+to+F ederal+Level/ article30353 .h tm. 
69. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 22 1 ,  228-29 ( 1 988) .  
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a company that was not using dealers at all. 7° In New York, the dealers-wisely, 
in hindsight-decided not to appeal the trial court's decision. In 
Massachusetts, the dealers appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, and 
soon regretted it. 
On September 15, 2014, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal of the dealers' complaint on standing grounds. But although 
technically only decided on standing, the court's opinion made clear that it 
doubted whether the direct distribution petition in the 1970 Massachusetts 
statute applied to pure direct distribution at all. It noted that the direct 
distribution prohibition had been included in what was described at the time 
as a "Dealers' Bill of Rights" that was meant only to protect dealers in franchise 
relationships.71 The court cast doubt on whether a manufacturer that owned 
its own stores was even operating a "dealership" within the meaning of the 
law.12 It took from the legislative history of the most recent amendments to 
the Massachusetts statute an understanding that the dealer franchise statutes 
were "intended and understood only to prohibit manufacturer-owned 
dealerships when, unlike Tesla, the manufacturer already had an affiliated 
dealer or dealers in Massachusetts."73 
A wave of panic spread across the dealers' lobby around the country. One 
of the most prestigious state supreme courts had ruled that their strongest 
bulwark against Tesla-the existing dealer protection laws-did not apply to 
pure direct distribution. If other states followed suit, that would put legislative 
inertia squarely on Tesla's side. The burden would be on the dealers to pass 
new statutes prohibiting pure direct distribution, which they had already 
failed to achieve in states like Missouri, Minnesota, and North Carolina.74 
What they had been unable to achieve openly, they would have to achieve 
through stealth . 
The dealers' opportunity arrived soon. In Michigan-home of the Big 
Three and hence naturally precarious territory for Tesla-Tesla had been 
cautiously planning to enter the market. The existing statute was ambiguous 
as to pure direct distribution. It provided that a car manufacturer could not 
"[s] ell any new motor vehicle directly to a retail customer other than through 
its franchised dealers."75 That little possessive "its" was potentially critical to 
the meaning of the statute. The statute assumed that a manufacturer had 
franchised dealers. Under a plausible reading, a manufacturer like Tesla that 
did not have franchised dealers at all would not be covered and therefore 
70. See Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 1 5  N.E.3d 1 1 5 2 ,  1 1 57 
( Mass. 201 4 ) ;  Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass' n  v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 969 N.Y.S.2d 72 1 ,  882 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 20 1 3 ) .  
7 1 .  Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 1 5  N.E.3d at 1 1 55-56. 
72. Id. at 1 1 57. 
73. Id. at 1 1 62.  
74. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text. 
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS§445 . 1 574( 1 ) (i) ( 2013 ) .  
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could open its own showrooms and service centers. Although the Michigan 
statute was differently worded than Massachusetts' statute, the Michigan 
provision was also in a dealer's bill of rights provision. The Michigan dealers 
fretted that, though differently worded, the Michigan statute might receive a 
similar interpretation to the Massachusetts statute. 
On October 1 ,  2014, an automotive dealer franchise bill that had been 
pending since May of 2014 came to the floor of the Michigan senate.76 The 
bill provided for an amendment to the auto franchise statute, but it only 
addressed titling fees and had nothing to do with direct distribution. When 
the bill came to the floor, a senator who reportedly received campaign 
contributions from the auto dealers and whose wife worked for a lobbying 
group that represented the auto dealers introduced a floor amendment 
making a few seemingly modest changes to the bill.77 One was to strike the 
word "its" from the statute. Suddenly, instead of saying that a manufacturer 
had to distribute only through "its" franchised dealers, the statute said that a 
manufacturer had to distribute through franchised dealers. No longer could 
Tesla argue that the current law applied only to manufacturers with franchise 
relationships. 
The amended bill passed both houses of the Legislature with a single 
dissenting vote.78 As the bill went to the Governor's desk, Tesla found out 
about it and began to lobby for a veto; it became apparent that few of the 
legislators who had voted nearly unanimously for the bill understood that it 
was aimed at Tesla. There was some other linguistic clean-up language in 
other parts of the bill, so most legislators apparently assumed striking the "its" 
was an insignificant technical change. The chair of the Democratic caucus 
later was quoted as saying that the Democratic members of the Legislature 
had no idea the floor amendment was aimed at Tesla.79 Meanwhile, the bill's 
sponsors engaged in some amazing logical jujitsu, simultaneously arguing that 
the bill was not actually anti-Tesla since the existing statute already applied to 
76. H.B. 5606, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 201 4). http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/ 
201 3-20 1 4/billengrossed/House/p�f/ 20 1 4-HEBS-5606.pdf. 
77. Stephen Edelstein,  Michigan Car Dealers Slip One over on Tesla, Ban Direct Sales: Updated, 
GREEN CAR REP. (Oct. 1 6, 2014) ,  http://www.greencarreports.com/news/ 1 094966_michigan­
car-<iealers-slip-one-<Jver-<Jn-tesla-ban-<iirect-sales. 
78. See S. 97-70, Reg. Sess., at 1 78 1-82 (Mich. 2014) ,  http://www.legislature.mi.gov/ 
(S(zlwptu3wqznkcqqywkfay5gv) ) /documents/201 3-2014/Journal/Senate/pdf/2014-SJ-1 0-<J2-
070.pdf; H.R. 97-73, Reg. Sess., at 1 87g-80 (Mich. 2014) ,  http://www.legislature.mi.gov/ 
(S(zlwptu3wqznkcqqywkfay5gv) ) I documents/ 201 3-20 1 4/Journal/House/pdf/ 201 4-HJ-1 O-<J2-
073.pdf. 
79. Vince Bond Jr., Anti-Tesla Bill Reaches Michigan Governor's Desk, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Oct. 
1 5, 2014,  1 2 :50 PM), http://www.autonews.com/article/2014 10 1 5/RETAIL07/ 1 4 1 0 1 9925/ 
anti-tesla-bill-reaches-michigan-governors-<iesk. 
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direct distribution and urged the governor to sign the bill to ensure that the 
law "applies to all manufacturers."8° 
Rick Snyder, the governor of Michigan, used to be the CEO of Gateway 
Computers, which distributed its products only directly to consumers,8• so he 
certainly understood the issue. But, in the middle of a tight re-election 
campaign, he was in a difficult position. He did not want to veto unanimous 
bi-partisan legislation or upset the dealers and Big Three on the eve of the 
election. In order to obtain cover, Snyder asked the Michigan Attorney 
General for an opinion as to whether the existing law already prohibited pure 
direct distribution. Without citing any legal authority resolving the issue or 
acknowledging that it was at minimum contestable, the Attorney General's 
chieflegal counsel replied that it did.82 Snyder then signed the bill, explaining 
that it was not anti-Tesla after all since Tesla was already prohibited from 
direct distribution.83 It  was as if a runner kneecapped a competitor, won the 
race, and then claimed that he would have won anyway since he was faster. 
No one was fooled by Snyder's explanation that the bill was not anti­
Tesla. Scores of news media headlines across the country riffed on some 
variation of "Michigan bans Tesla."84 The Information Technology & 
Innovation Foundation named Michigan one of four winners of its annual 
So. Greg Gardner, Michigan Weighs Whether to Bar Tesla, USA TODAY (Oct. 19, 2014,  5:00 
AM), http:/ /www.usatoday.com/story/money/ cars/20 1 4/ 1 0/ 1 9/michigan-tesla/ 1 7544663. 
8 1 .  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
82 .  Letter from Rick Snyder, Governor, State of  Mich., to Mich. House of  Representatives 
& Mich. Senate (Oct. 2 1 ,  2014) ,  http://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/HB_5606_ 
Signing_Letter_4 72039_ 7 .  pdf. 
83. In his signing statement, Snyder offered an explanation for the deletion of the word 
"its" that can only be fairly characterized as ludicrous: "This change would appear merely to allow 
manufacturers who do not have their own franchised dealers to sell through another 
manufactuerer's [sic] network of franchised dealers." Id. The suggestion that the problem being 
solved was that, say, Chevrolet would want to sell Corvettes through Ford dealers, is too 
preposterous to take seriously. 
84. See, e.g., Greg Gardner, Gov. Snyder Signs Bill Banning Direct Tesla Sales, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Oct. 22, 2014, 1 1 :22 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/general-motors/ 
2014/ 1o/ 1 7/michigan-verge-banning-tesla-stores/ 1 73862 5 1 ;  Jeff Gilbert, Governor Snyder Signs 
Michigan Tesla Ban, CBS DETROIT (Oct. 2 1 ,  2014, 3:29 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/ 
2014/ 1o/ 2 1  I govemor-signs-michigan-tesla-ban; Chris Isidore, Tesla Blocked from Selling in 
Michigan, CNN MONEY (Oct. 2 1 ,  20 1 4, 3:42 PM) , http://money.cnn.com/2014/ io/2 1 /  
news/ companies/tesla-michigan; Micheline Maynard, Michigan to Tesla Motors: You 're Not Welcome, 
FORBES (Oct. 2 1 ,  2014, 1 :33 PM) , http://www.forbes.com/sites/michelinemaynard/201 4/ 
1 o/2 1 /michigan-to-tesla-motors-youre-not-welcome; Lucy Nicholson, Michigan Becomes Fifth U.S. 
State to Thwart Direct Tesla Car Sales, REUTERS (Oct. 2 1 ,  2014, 5:40 PM) , http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/ 201 4/ 1o/2 1 /uHesla-motors-michigan-idUSKCN01A2MR2014102 1 ;  Robert Sorokanich, GM 
Supports Anti-Tesla Bill in MI, Snyder Signs into Law, ROAD & TRACK (Oct. 2 1 ,  201 4, 10:45 AM), http:// 
www.roadandtrack.com/car-culture/videos/a6309/michigan-govemor-snyder-signs-gm-backed-anti­
tesla-bill-into-law. 
2016] TESLA, DEALER FRANCHISE LA WS, AND POUT/CS 589 
"Luddite Award" based on the new legislation.8s Even the Wall Street]ouma� 
Snyder's usual bosom buddy, issued an editorial chastising the Governor for 
signing protectionist anti-Tesla legislation.86 
The Tesla wars continue. As of this writing, pro-Tesla bills are under 
consideration in Michigan and Texas, and more will be on the table in 2015 .  
Thus far, neither side has been able to move the needle in state legislatures 
except through compromise or (as in Michigan) stealth. The state regulatory 
commissions have tended to favor the dealers and the courts Tesla. 
2 .  The Big Three's Cautious Waiting Game 
With the National Automobile Dealers Association and state dealer 
associations doing the heavy lifting, the Big Three domestic automobile 
companies have not had to take the lead in opposing Tesla's innovative 
distribution model. Nonetheless, two out of the three-General Motors and 
Ford-have supported the dealers in blocking direct distribution, with GM 
taking the more aggressive position.87 (To my knowledge, Chrysler has stayed 
silent.) GM and Ford have explained their position as simply seeking equal 
treatment for all car manufacturers.88 While that argument is plausible, the 
story is somewhat more complex. 
The legacy car companies' incentives with respect to direct distribution 
are mixed. On the one hand, especially with Internet-enabled marketing 
reducing some of the transactions costs of distribution, the legacy companies 
would probably benefit from doing some direct distribution of their own. In 
1999, Ford dipped its toes into the water. It set up a website to re-sell used 
Fords that had been previously leased, used as service vehicles, or rented out 
by national car rental companies.89 Interested customers could place a $300 
85. Robert Sorokanich, Gau. Snyder's Anti-Tesla Law Wins Michigan the "Luddite Award", CAR 
& DRIVER Oan. 8, 20 1 5, 1 0:23 AM), http://blog.caranddriver.com/gov-snyders-anti-tesla-law­
wins-michigan-the-luddite-award. 
86. Rick Snyder Drives off the Road: Michigan '.s Pro-Market Gauernor Embraces the Car Dealer Cartel, 
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 24, 2014, T 1 8  PM) , www.wsj.com/ articles/ rick-snyder-drives-off-the-road-
1 4 1 4 1 92688. 
87. Justin Lloyd-Miller, Tesla's Public Appeal Falls Short as Michigan Bans Direct Sales, CHEAT 
SHEET: AUTOS (Oct. 22 ,  2014) ,  http:/ /www.cheatsheet.com/automobiles/teslas-public-appeal­
falls-short-as-michigan-bans-direct-sales.html/?a=viewall ("We applaud Gov. Snyder's action of 
signing HB 5606. The bill will provide a level playing field for all automobile manufacturers 
selling vehicles in Michigan . . . .  " (quoting Ford) )  ; Jared Meyer, 'Anti-Tesla Bill' Means Economic Loss 
for Michigan, TOWNHALL (Oct. 25, 2014), http://townhall.com/columnists/jaredmeyer/2014/10/ 
25/antitesla-bill-equals-an-economic-loss-for-michigan-n 1 909263/page/full (reporting that both 
GM and Ford supported the Michigan bill) ; David Shepardson, GM Backs Anti-Tesla Michigan Bill, 
DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 2 1 ,  20 14, 1 2 :22 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/ 
general-motors/2014/ 1 0/ 2 1/tesla-bill-michigan/ 1 766258 1 ("We believe that House Bill 5606 
will help ensure that all automotive manufacturers follow the same rules to operate in the State 
of Michigan; therefore, we encourage Governor Snyder to sign it . . . .  " (quoting GM) ) .  
88. See supra note 87. 
89. Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 200 1 ) .  
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refundable deposit and then inspect the car after it was delivered to a 
participating dealer.9° If the customer opted to purchase the vehicle at the 
Ford-determined "no-haggle price," Ford would receive payment from the 
customer and then transfer the title through the dealer, which was paid a fee 
for its service.91 This model did not cut out the dealers entirely, but provoked 
sufficient consternation among the dealers that the Texas Department of 
Transportation shut it down under the Texas dealer franchise law.92 As will be 
discussed further in Part IV, Ford mounted and lost Equal Protection and 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Its experiment with direct 
distribution ended. 
But if the legacy car companies have some interest in direct distribution, 
they also can use legal barriers to direct distribution to slow the advent of rival 
technologies on the market. As discussed in the previous section, new 
technologies often require new distribution methods. It follows that 
incumben t  technologies can slow the competitive onset of new technologies 
by securing the enactment of laws requiring distribution through 
conventional methods. Even though some of those distribution methods 
might be advantageous to the incumbents also, shutting off those distribution 
methods may provide a net gain to the incumbents if it disadvantages new 
entrants more than it disadvantages the incumbents.93 To the extent that the 
legacy companies view Tesla and other EV entrants as dangerous, competitive 
threats, supporting bans on direct distribution may be an effective tactic to 
slow Tesla's market penetration. 
A letter from GM to Ohio Governor John Kasich exemplifies the tensions 
in the legacy companies' position.94 GM wrote Kasich to oppose the ultimately 
successful legislative bill that allowed Tesla to establish three dealerships in 
the state.95 GM stressed its economic contributions to the state of Ohio and 
its opposition to "unique, favorable protection" for Tesla.96 It pointed out the 
"highly competitive" nature of the car market and asserted that "Tesla would 
gain a distinct competitive advantage by avoiding restrictions that all other 
auto manufacturers face in Ohio. "97 
Reading between the lines, GM effectively argued that direct distribution 
is more efficient than dealer distribution and, hence, that a company able to 
go. Id. 
g i .  Id. 
92.  Id. 
93. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' 
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 275-76 ( 1 986) . 
94. Letter from Selim Bingo!, Senior Vice President, Glob. Commc'ns. & Pub. Policy, Gen. 
Motors, to John Kasich, Governor of Ohio (Mar. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Kasich Letter] , http:/ I 
insideevs.com/ general-motors-sends-an ti-tesla-letter-ohio-governor. 
95. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
96. Kasich Letter, supra note 94. 
97. Id. 
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distribute directly obtains a competitive advantage over its rivals. But if that is 
so, it is hard to understand the conclusion that follows in GM's letter-that 
direct distribution should be prohibited for everyone. If direct distribution is a 
more efficient means of distribution, the logical implication is that it should 
be allowed for everyone. 
For now, GM's political calculation seems to be a combination of a fear 
of being outflanked by Tesla and an unwillingness to anger its dealers by 
entering the fray on the side of direct distribution. Additionally, GM realizes 
that the amount of political capital necessary to reverse the decades-old direct 
distribution bans in their entirety is considerably greater than that necessary 
to achieve small-bore exemptions for a new entrant. But as Tesla or other EV 
makers gain traction in the longer run, there may reach a tipping point where 
some amount of direct distribution appears inevitable and the legacy 
companies begin to demand the same rights for themselves. 
Another tipping point may occur as Tesla reaches a larger scale. As Tesla 
gains wider market acceptance, it will likely find that the small number of 
dealerships allotted to it in the compromise statutes do not suffice. Further, it 
may become economically prohibitive to run a full-scale distribution network 
on its own. As noted earlier, Elon Musk has publicly acknowledged that Tesla 
may eventually need to move to a dual distribution model, as Apple has now.98 
Expanding the number of dealerships and moving to dual distribution would 
require a new round of legislative action, since the existing compromise laws 
are generally written with caps and only apply to manufacturers pursuing pure 
direct distribution. If and when Tesla enters its second generation as a 
company and must fight its second round in state legislatures, it may find itself 
in the company of a wider coalition of manufacturers, including some of the 
legacy American companies and Asian or German companies. 
The current set of legislative compromises, political alliances, and 
outcomes is inherently unstable. In the longer run, there will likely be an even 
more aggressive confrontation between the dealers and a wider coalition of 
automobile manufacturers.99 
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS 
A. VERTICAL INTEGRATION: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the context ofliberalizing antitrust rules concerning vertical restraints, 
the Supreme Court has remarked that restrictive antitrust rules have 
sometimes induced firms "to integrate forward into distribution," cutting out 
franchisees or independent distributors altogether.1°0 As Ronald Coase 
observed in The Nature of the Firm: Influence, whether a firm decides to perform 
98. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
99. Preemptive federal legislation is another possibility, although the fact that there are many 
dealers in every Congressional district may make it difficult to pass significant reform legislation. 
1 00. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,  1 6- 1 7  ( 1 997) . 
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any particular commercial function, such as distribution, in house or to buy 
that service on the market, is a function of the respective transactions costs of 
the two choices. 10 1  Firms have many reasons for preferring direct distribution. 
Vertical integration into distribution may minimize transactions costs10• and 
protect against free-riding by rival manufacturers. 1 03 Some manufacturers that 
distribute primarily through independent retailers retain some factory-owned 
stores in order to set a benchmark for evaluating franchisees' performance 
and testing new products or distribution methods. Manufacturers may also be 
concerned about the exercise of market power by retailers, which could lead 
to double marginalization, in which each successive link in a vertical chain of 
firms with market power sets prices above marginal costs in a way that reduces 
the profits of the manufacturer and reduces consumer welfare. 104 As noted 
earlier with respect to Tesla specifically, a manufacturer may be concerned 
that the retailer will make insufficient investments in the promotion of the 
manufacturer's brand.10s 
There are also many reasons for a manufacturer to prefer franchised or 
independent distribution of its products under certain market circumstances. 
Distributing through dealers allows the manufacturer to lower its costs, by 
having other firms absorb the predominant share of the distribution costs, 
and focus on its core competencies in manufacturing. 106 Dealers may also 
have superior local market knowledge or expertise in distribution. 1 07 And to 
the extent that dealers are carrying multiple brands in a single store or 
distribution system, franchising (or dealer distribution) may allow the 
manufacturer to achieve economies of scale or scope.108 
There is no a priori reason to expect that either integration forward into 
distribution or distribution through dealers will be a preferable strategy for a 
firm as a general matter. Nor is there any general reason for the law to favor 
one form or the other. Under most market circumstances, competition and 
the profit-maximization incentive will push manufacturers to choose the most 
efficient distribution method-whether pure direct distribution, pure dealer 
distribution, or some mixed model. The question is whether there is anything 
1 0 1 .  R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: 11!fiuence, 4].L. ECON. & 0RG. 33, 3 9  ( 1 988) . 
1 02 .  OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS 84 ( 1 975) . 
1 03. Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: 
A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory, 32 
EMORYLJ . 1 009, 1 084 ( 1 983) . 
I 04. JEAN TIRO LE, THE THEORY OF I NDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1 6g-203 ( 1 988).  
1 05. See supra text accompanying notes 33-3 7. 
I 06. See generally ROGER 0. BLAIR & FRA NCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 
I ( 2005). 
107. Id. at 1-2. 
1 08. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 54 1-42 (3d ed. 1 990). 
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unique about car distribution that would justify mandating a particular form 
of distribution. 
B. THE DEALERS ' FRAIL ARGUMENTS FOR PROHIBITING PURE DIRECT DISTRIBUTION 
The dealers have presented a variety of arguments in public debate for 
restrictions on direct distribution. Some of their arguments are simply paeans 
to the virtues of the dealer franchise system, reasons that manufacturers 
should embrace dealer distribution. I do not consider such arguments here 
since they are not responsive to the issue actually raised by prohibitions on 
direct distribution. Surely there are economic benefits to franchising or 
independent distribution, and one would expect to see some manufacturers 
continue to embrace franchising or dual distribution in an unregulated 
market. If the dealers are correct that franchised distribution is more efficient, 
any manufacturer foolishly choosing a different strategy will be punished in 
the market and soon repent. The only relevant question is whether 
manufacturers should be prohibited from opening their own showrooms and 
service centers. 
As noted earlier, the dealer franchise statutes passed in the 1950s were 
explicitly styled as dealer protection laws and justified as protecting dealers 
from the superior bargaining power of manufacturers. 109 Since, as the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held, pure direct distribution does not impact 
these concerns, the dealers have attempted to reframe these prohibitions as 
"consumer protection" measures."0 The dealers' efforts to transform these 
dealer protection statutes into consumer protection statutes are remarkably 
unpersuasive. 
i .  Breaking the Manufacturer's  "Retail Monopoly" 
The dealers usually lead with, and lean most heavily on, the argument 
that distribution through dealers is necessary to reduce prices to consumers. 
A conventional form of this argument goes like this: Unless required to 
distribute through dealers, manufacturers enjoy a monopoly over the 
distribution of cars in their own brand. Manufacturers will exploit this market 
power to raise retail prices above competitive levels. With multiple dealers 
distributing the manufacturer's product, consumers will obtain lower prices 
1 og. See supra Part II.A. 
1 10. See Chris Kardish, Automaker Tesla Takes Fight to North Carolina, AssOCIATED PRESS (May 
25, 201 3, 1 2 :34 PM) , http:/ /www.apnewsarchive.com/ 2013/ Automaker_Tesla_takes_fight_to_ 
North_Carolina/id-c2c1 86809b1 qge8bdo1 484fga2257fg ("'It's a consumer protection,' said 
Bob Glaser, president of the [North Carolina Automobile Dealers Association] .") ;  see also 
Aschbrenner, supra note 59 (noting that Bruce Anderson, president of the Iowa Automobile 
Dealers Association, called licensing a "consumer protection" measure) .  
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through intra-brand competition. 1 1 1  This argument is counter to economic 
theory, empirical evidence, and the dealers' own admissions. 
First, the argument contravenes economic principles by assuming that a 
manufacturer will attempt to extract a retail monopoly mark-up over and 
above the profit-maximizing wholesale price. A manufacturer's price, whether 
at wholesale or retail, will reflect the full exercise of the manufacturer's 
market power, if any. 1 1 2  If  the manufacturer embeds its market-power 
premium in its wholesale price, it cannot increase its profits by adding an 
additional retail mark-up. 1 1 3  Such a mark-up would decrease its profits 
because demand at retail would necessarily be elastic, hence the manufacturer 
would see a decline in demand for its product. As the Supreme Court 
recognized in the vertical restraints context, the interests of consumers and 
of manufacturers are aligned on the question of retailer market power­
neither favor it. 1 14 
Indeed, if anything, vertical integration by manufacturers should result 
in a lowering of retail prices, even if there are no efficiencies or cost savings 
to vertical integration. If both the manufacturer and the retailers in its brand 
have some degree of market power, then distribution through dealers could 
1 1 1 . See, e.g.,JeffCobb, Why Auto Dealer Associations oppose Tesla, HYBRJDCARs (May 2 1 ,  2013) ,  
http:/ /www.hybridcars.com/why-auto-clealer-associations-oppose-tesla ("Now to me fewer 
dealers drives the price up . . . .  The price doesn't go down when they have fewer outlets. And 
when they talk about the manufacturer being able to save more selling direct, there's nothing 
that says they pass that along to the customer." (quoting Bill Wolters, President, Texas Auto 
Dealers Association) ) ;  Jonathan Collegio, Reply to Dan Miller, Should Tesla (and Other Auto 
Manufacturers) Be Able to Sell Cars Directly to Consumers?, OUR ENERGY POLICY (Oct. 27,  2014, 9:09 
PM), http:/ /www.ourenergypolicy.org/should-tesla-and-0ther-auto-manufacturers-be-able-to-sell­
cars-directly-to-consumers/#comments (noting that car companies "would not have the same set 
of incentives to keep costs down that dealers have, because they would not have competitors within 
the same brand. (E.g. two Chevy stores owned by GM can't really compete with each other in the 
same way as two business owners with skin in the game) ");  Michael Martinez & Michael Wayland, 
Snyder Weighs Pulling Plug on Direct Tesla Sales, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 1 6, 2014, 1 : 16  PM) , http:// 
www.detroitnews.com/ story /business/ autos/ 2014/ 1 o/ 1 6/ tesla-faces-direct-sales-ban-michigan/ 
1 7359253 ("For consumers buying a new car today, the fierce competition between local dealers 
in any given market drives down prices both in and across brands . . . .  If a factory owned all of its 
stores, it could set prices and buyers would lose virtually all bargaining power." (quoting Charles 
Cyrill, spokesman for the National Automobile Dealers Association) ) ;  Tesla Business Model in NJ. 
'Unlawful': Appleton, BLOOMBERG Bus., http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/53f689ff­
aco1-4dff-b2c6-1 2c927679073 (last visited Nov. 1 4, 2015) [hereinafter Market Makers] (James 
Appleton, President, New Jersey Coalition of Automotive Retailers, appearing on Bloomberg 
Television "Market Makers" on March 1 2, 2014, and asserting that a manufacturer has a 
"monopoly" in retail distribution) . 
1 1 2 .  SCHERER & Ross, supra note 1 08, at 541-42 (explaining that an upstream monopolist 
would prefer to sell to a downstream competitive firm); see also Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual 
Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 655, 665 (Richard Schmalensee & 
Robert D. Willig eds., 1 989). 
1 1 3 .  PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST A.'IALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CAsES 
489 (5th ed. 1 997) ("The power already possessed by the . . .  monopolist to control the price and 
output . . .  effectively controls the price and output of independent [downstream firms] .") .  
1 1 4. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.  PSKS, Inc. ,  551  U.S. 877, 896 (2007) .  
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result in double marginalization, as discussed above. 1 1 5 Conversely, vertical 
integration by the manufacturer would create an incentive to lower retail 
prices . 1 1 6  
A second reason to doubt the dealers' argument is  empirical. In 2009, 
the United States Justice Department published a competition advocacy paper 
by its Economic Analysis Group that analyzed the effects of state bans on 
direct distribution . 1 1 1  Relying on an earlier study by Goldman Sachs, the 
report found that direct distribution could save consumers on average $ 2 2 2 5  
o r  about 8.6% per vehicle . 1 18 These savings arose from improvements in  
matching supply with customer demand, lower inventory, fewer dealerships, 
lower sales commissions, and lower shipping costs. 1 1 9  I am unaware of any 
empirical evidence suggesting that distribution through dealers lowers prices 
to consumers. 
Finally, it is quite apparent that the dealers do not believe that mandatory 
distribution through franchisees results in higher prices. For one, it  
contravenes their longstanding assertion that manufacturers should not be 
allowed to compete against their own franchisees because they would 
undercut them on price. Moreover, the dealers' private legal strategies against 
Tesla depend on a showing that Tesla would undermine them on price. In 
Massachusetts, for example, the dealers found themselves in  a battle over 
standing. They argued that they had suffered injury because direct 
distribution by Tesla would lead to "inequitable pricing," to their 
detriment.1 20 Of course, "inequitable" has to mean "too low," otherwise the 
dealers would not have suffered cognizable injury. 1 2 1 
1 1 5 .  See supra notes 1 04--05, 1 1 0-1 3, and accompanying text. 
1 1 6. A study of Spanish auto distribution market, where direct distribution is permitted, 
found that vertically integrated sales outlets have considerably lower profitability than franchised 
dealership. See Benito Arrmiada et al., Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The 
Case of Automobile Distribution, 1 7  J.L. ECON. & ORG. 257, 275 (2001 ) .  
1 1 7. GERALD R. BODISCH, ECON. ANALYSIS GRP., ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE BANS ON 
DIRECT MANUFACTURER SALES TO CAR BUYERS ( 2009) ,  http://wwwJustice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/atr /legacy I 2009/ 05/ 28/ 24637 4.pdf. 
1 1 8 .  Id. at 4. There is a question as to how much of these marginal costs savings would be 
passed on to consumers. Under standard economic assumptions, consumers would receive at 
least half of the savings even if the manufacturer were a monopolist. See generally Jeremy I. Bulow 
& Paul Pfleiderer, Comment, A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices, 91 J. POL. ECON. 1 8 2  
( 1 983) . I n  a competitive market-which the automotive market i s  today-they would receive the 
substantial majority of the marginal cost savings. 
1 1 9. BODISCH, supra note 1 1 7, at 4. 
1 20. Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 15 N.E.3d 1 1 52 ,  1 1 59 
(Mass. 2014) ; see also Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 969 N.Y.S.2d 
72 1 ,  878 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 20 1 3) (discussing dealers' claims that they will suffer "competitive 
economic injury" from direct distribution by Tesla) . 
1 2 1 .  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., LTD v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,  475 U.S. 574, 582-83 ( 1 986) 
(explaining that competitors lack standing to challenge prices that are allegedly too high, since 
any such prices help rather than hurt competitors) . 
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In arguing that direct distribution increases consumer prices, the dealers 
have cited Tesla's one-price, no-haggle policies as harmful to consumers' 
interests . 1 2 2  Whether no-haggle policies are, as a general matter, good or bad 
for consumers is uncertain, 1 23 but that has little to do with whether permitting 
direct distribution is good for consumers. As noted, a manufacturer cannot 
increase its profits by marking up retail prices to reflect a retail market power 
premium and direct distribution can create process efficiencies, lower 
marginal costs of distribution, and eliminate double marginalization 
regardless of whether the manufacturer allows or prohibits retail haggling. 
The consumer price reduction theory is farcical. It is possible that retail 
distribution through independent dealers could lower prices to consumers, 
but only if the dealers were more efficient at retail distribution than the 
manufacturer. But, in that case, the manufacturer would have every incentive 
to distribute through dealers, which would increase its wholesale sales (which 
would still embed the full market-power premium) and hence its profits. 
Regulation is not necessary to prevent the exploitation of market power in 
this context. To the contrary, it has the effect of denying manufacturers and 
consumers a more efficient means of distribution. 
2 .  Assuring Adequate Levels of  After-Market Service 
A second "consumer welfare" argument offered by the dealers is that 
dealer distribution is necessary to ensure that customers receive adequate 
levels of service. 1 24 But there is no reason to think that manufacturers like 
Tesla have any incentive to offer subpar service through their company-owned 
stores. Car manufacturers make multi-billion-dollar investments to create new 
car technologies and brands, investments they cannot recoup without 
creating long-term customer loyalty. In the case of EV technology, these 
I 22 .  Peter Valdes-Dapena, Tesla 's Fight with America s Car Dealers, CNN MONEY (May 20, 20I 3, 
3:04 PM) , http://money.cnn.com/20I 3/05/20/autos/telsa-car-dealers. 
I 23. See Xiaohua Zeng et al., The Competitive Implications of a "No-Haggle" Pricing Policy: 
The Access Toyota Case 23-24 (Sept. g, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://rady.ucsd. 
edu/faculty/seminars/2008/papers/weinburg.pdf (finding in an empirical study of no-haggle 
policy by Toyota that the consumer welfare effects could not be conclusively determined); Preyas 
S. Desai & Devavrat Purohit, "Let Me Talk to My Manager": Haggling in a Competitive Environment, 
23 MARKETING SCI. 2 I g, 2 I g-22 (2004) . 
I 24. Daniel O'Connor, Tesla, the Auto Dealers and New Jersey: Playing the Consumer Protection 
Card, DISCO (Mar. I I ,  2014) ,  http://www.project-disco.org/competition/03 I 1 14-tesla-the-auto­
dealers-and-newjersey-playing-the-consumer-protection-card ("David Hyatt, VP of Public Affairs 
for the National Automobile Dealers Association, echoed a similar talking point when he said, 
'the franchise dealer network promotes public safety and instills confidence in the consumer that 
there will be a place to go when help is needed. '") ; id. ("Bob Glaser, head of the North Carolina 
Dealers Association, made a similar argument in discussing his association's push for even more 
restrictive legislation that would ban all I nternet car sales from the manufacturer to North 
Carolina residents: 'It's a consumer protection [issue] . . .  and why we say that a dealer who has 
invested a significant amount of capital in a community is more committed to taking care of that 
area's customers.'" (alteration in original) ) .  
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incentives are particularly acute, since Tesla not only has to create new EV 
technologies, but is investing heavily to develop supercharging and battery­
swap infrastructures necessary for broad deployment of its cars . 1 25 Without 
creating brand loyalty, including through adequate levels of after-market 
service, it cannot hope to recoup these sunk investments. 
Ironically, it is the direct distribution prohibitions themselves that are 
impairing Tesla's ability to provide after-market customer service. Since the 
statutory prohibitions typically apply not only to car sales but also to after­
market service, Tesla is prohibited from opening service centers in many 
states. Customers in those states can still buy Tesla vehicles off a truck from 
Tesla or by traveling to other states, but they cannot access Tesla service in 
their home state. 
The dealers have argued that dealer distribution ensures that there will 
be someone available to service the cars if a manufacturer goes bankrupt, as 
happened with Fisker. 1 26 This argument is also unfounded. For one, it 
assumes that the likely failure rate of car manufacturers is higher than that of 
car dealers, which seems counterintuitive. Second, it assumes that the 
availability of post-market service depends upon the presence of franchised 
dealers. A franchised dealer of a defunct manufacturer will only continue 
providing service in a particular brand if servicing that brand with customers 
paying out of pocket remains profitable. If it does, then there is no reason 
that only a franchised dealer would offer service. As noted earlier, Fisker 
announced a dealer distribution model . 1 21 After its bankruptcy, many owners 
were left orphaned without adequate service through dealers, at which point 
a company called Hybrid Support Solutions came along and began offering 
Fisker owners annual support packages for $4000. 1 28 With respect to Fisker­
a dealer franchise company-the companies rescuing orphaned buyers have 
reportedly not been dealers, but other third parties looking to make a 
profit. 129 There is no reason to think that mandating distribution through 
dealers will protect customers in after-markets. 
1 25. Don Sherman, Tesla Across America: How Elon Musk Is Building an EV Infrastructure, CAR 
& DRNER (Oct. 20 13 ) ,  http:/ /www.caranddriver.com/features/how-tesla-and-elon-musk-are­
building-an-ev-infrastructure-feature. 
1 26. See Valdes-Dapena, supra note 1 22 .  
1 27. See supra text accompanying notes 4 1 -44. 
1 28. Antony Ingram, Orphaned Fisker Owners Offered $1K/Year Seroice Contract by . . . Whom?, 
GREEN CAR REP. (May 30, 2013 ) ,  http://www.greencarreports.com/news/ 1 084484_orphaned­
fisker-owners-offered-4k-year-service-contract-by-whom. 
1 29. Patrick George, UsedFiskerKarmasAreSellingfor50 % o.ffMSRP,JALOPNIK (May 1 7, 2013, 1 0:02 
AM), http:/ /jalopnik.com/used-fisker-karmas-are-selling-for-50-0ff-msrp-508 1 87464 (reporting that 
many Esker owners felt stranded by Fisker's bankruptcy, but that third parties might step up to provide 
setvice). 
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3.  Complying with State Regulatory Requirements 
The dealers have also argued, without much elaboration, that automobile 
distribution is pervasively regulated and that dealer distribution is necessary 
in order to ensure compliance with state regulatory requirements, such as 
titling, registration, lemon law protection, and the like. 1 3° To be sure, 
automobile distribution is pervasively regulated, but it hardly follows from 
that observation that distribution must be mandated to occur through 
dealers. 
The implicit structure of the dealers' argument must be that dealers have 
a higher regulatory compliance rate than manufacturers. I am unaware of any 
support for that assumption. If anything, the average regulatory compliance 
rate might be higher with company-owned stores than with independent 
franchises. According to the Consumer Federation of America and Better 
Business Bureau, consumers complain about car dealerships more than any 
other business i n  the United States. '3 '  Empirical evidence shows that larger 
scale firms enjoy economies of scale in achieving regulatory compliance, 
which suggests that smaller scale firms, including smaller dealerships, might 
be more prone to regulatory non-compliance than large-scale 
manufacturers. 1 32 
There is no reason to believe that car manufacturers would be less 
compliant on average than dealers if allowed to engage in direct distribution. 
Further, if it turned out that company-owned stores were more compliant with 
state regulatory requirements than independent dealerships, the logical 
implication of the dealers' argument would be that dealer distribution should 
be prohibited and direct distribution mandated. 1 33 Presumably, this is not an 
argument that the dealers would be interested in exploring to its logical 
conclusions. 
4. Ensuring Vehicle Safety 
The dealers have argued that prohibiting direct distribution promotes 
vehicle safety because dealers have greater incentives than do manufacturers 
1 30. See, e.g., Jonathan Collegio, Reply to OurEnergyPolicy.org, Should Tesla (and Other Auto 
Manufacturers) Be Able to Sell Cars Directly to Consumers?, OURENERGYPOLICY.ORG (Oct. 27,  2014,  
3: 2 3 PM), http:/ /www.ourenergypolicy.org/ should-tesla-and-other-auto-manufacturers-be-able­
to-sell-cars-directly-to-consumers/#comments; see also Aschbrenner, supra note 59. 
1 3 1 .  See Nation 's Tap Ten Consumer Complaints, CONSUMER FED' N  AM. Qui. 3 1 ,  2013) ,  http:// 
www.consumerfed.org/news/696; Consumer Complaint Surveys, CONSUMERS FOR AUTO RELIABILITY 
& SAFETY ( 2014) ,  http:/ /www.carconsumers.org/sul>'eys.htm. 
1 32 .  WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESSES: THEIR 
ROLE AND REGULATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 65 ( 1 986) ; JACK FAUCETT Assocs., ECONOMIES OF 
SCALE IN REGULATORY COMPLIANCE: EVIDENCE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF REGULATION BY 
FIRM SIZE I ( 1 984) .  
1 33. See generally NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, UNIV. OF CAL, SANTA BARBARA, Two CHEERS FOR 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION: CORPORATE GoVERNANCE I N A  WORLD OF GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS (2014) ,  
http:/ I f.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir I 989/files/ 2014/ 03/Lich tenstein-2 . pdf. 
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to pursue safety recalls. 1 34 Dealer lobbyists point to recent scandals involving 
GM's failure to issue timely safety recalls, leading to a number of deaths, as a 
reason that the manufacturers cannot be trusted on recalls. 135 But, 
inconveniently for the dealers, the GM recall failures all occurred in the 
context of franchised distribution. So if the dealership model is supposed to 
serve as a guarantor of vehicle safety, then the GM recall failures are failures 
of the dealership model, not reasons to require it. 
Whether a manufacturer distributes directly or through dealers has 
nothing to do with the incidence or servicing of recalls. Dealers do not make 
recall decisions. Under federal law, the obligation to report vehicle safety 
defects to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") 
rests solely on the manufacturer. 1 36 The submitting manufacturer then 
proposes a remedial program, which is reviewed for approval by the 
NHTSA.137 When manufacturers fail to implement recalls requested by 
NHTSA, the agency may issue an administrative order requiring a recall. 1 38 
This entire process is run by the manufacturers and the NHTSA without 
dealer involvement. 
The dealers have also argued that, once a recall is issued, the dealers have 
a greater incentive to see it performed than do the manufacturers, since the 
manufacturer is paying the dealer to perform the service.139 But this argument 
assumes that, having issued an NHTSA-mandated recall, a manufacturer­
owned service center will refuse to perform the service when customers 
request it. That would be a flagrant and easily detectable violation of federal 
law, and there is no reason to think it would be a systematic problem. 
5. Dealers as Uniquely Virtuous Local Citizens 
A final argument advanced by the car dealers is more faithful to the spirit 
of the original dealer protection laws insofar as it admits that the laws protect 
the dealers from manufacturer competition. But this protectionism is justified 
on the ostensible grounds that the dealers are unique bastions of virtue in 
local communities because they pump in tax revenues, employ people, make 
large philanthropic contributions, and preserve small business values. 14° It is 
hard to take these arguments seriously. 
1 34· Get the Facts: The Benefits of Franchised New Car Dealers, NAT'LAUTOMOBILE DEALERS Ass'N, 
http://www.nada.org/GetTheFacts (last visited Nov. 14, 20 1 5) (arguing that dealers " (t]ake the 
side of consumers in warranty and safety recalls") . 
1 35· Market Makers, supra note 1 1 1 .  
1 36. NAT'L HIGHWAYTRAFFICSAFElY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'TOFTRANSP., SAFE1YRECALL C0MPENDIUM 
4 (n.d.), http:/ /www-0di.nhtsa.dot.gov I cars/ problems/ recalls/ documents/ recompendium. pdf. 
1 37· Id. aq. 
1 38. Id. at 1 5 .  
1 39· Market Makers, supra note l l L 
1 40. John O'Dell, '!Wiy Tesla Should Stop Fighting Auto Dealers, CNN (Mar. 1 8, 20 14, 6:08 PM) ,  
http:/ /www.cnn.com/ 2014/ 03/ 1 8/ opinion/ odell-tesla-newjersey (opining that "car dealerships 
are important corporate citizens, pumping into the national economy hundreds of millions of sales-
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First, to the extent that manufacturer-owned stores displaced dealer­
owned stores, the effects would be tax neutral. Internet direct sales models 
not involving a physical presence by the seller in the state may reduce state 
and local sales tax revenues, but the issue in question is not pure Internet sales 
but rather opening brick and mortar stores and service centers in the states. 
Any such stores would remit the same real estate, sales, franchise fee, and 
other state and local taxes as independent dealers. If anything, since Tesla can 
and does already conduct Internet sales, adding a physical store in the state 
might increase state and local tax revenues. 
The argument that direct distribution would lower local employment 
rates by cutting out a sales force is also off the mark. Tesla already engages in 
direct distribution and Internet sales, but is  prohibited from opening stores 
and service centers in many states. If it opened those stores and service 
centers, it would need to hire a local workforce to run them. To the extent 
that the dealers' argument is that Tesla would run its stores and service centers 
in a more streamlined way than dealers do and hence employ a smaller sales 
force, they are effectively arguing for mandating a less efficient means of 
distribution. It seems prima facie undesirable to mandate dealer distribution 
just to protect inefficient distribution models that create needless jobs. 
The point about local philanthropic giving is also fishy. According to the 
dealers' own self-survey, fewer than half of the dealers donated more than 
$25,000 to non-profit organizations or charitable causes in 201 3 . 1 41 Is the rate 
of charitable contribution greater on average for car dealerships than for 
other industry sectors? I know of no evidence that it is. Even if it were, it would 
be inefficient to subsidize charitable organizations by granting a particular 
industry a protected position against competition on the hopes that it would 
share with charities some of the monopoly profits it extracted from 
consumers. It would be far more efficient for the states simply to levy a general 
tax on consumers and redistribute the proceeds to worthy causes. 
Finally, the picture of car dealers as "mom and pop" shops, or to quote 
Justice Peckham's famous aphorism "small dealers and worthy men," 142 is 
increasingly misguided. Although small dealerships remain, particularly in 
rural areas where manufacturers are unlikely to open company-owned stores 
anyway, automotive retailing in suburban and urban areas has become big 
business. Many dealers are part of large groups comprising many different 
tax dollars, tens of millions of dollars in charitable contributions and billions of dollars in 
paychecks") ; Popper, supra note 45 (" [Tesla] wanted to go direct, which means no sales force. That's 
cutting out a lot of people." (quoting a car dealer) ) .  
1 4 1 .  Auto Dealers Increase Charitable GWing, Focu.wn Local  Communities, ALLY (Oct 1 3 ,  2014) ,  https:/ I 
media.ally.com/ 20 1 4-1 0-1 3-Au to-dealers-increase-chari table-giving-focus-on-local-<:ommuni ties. 
1 42 .  United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 1 66 U.S. 290, 323 ( 1 897) ("Trade or 
commerce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately restrained by 
driving out of business the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, 
and who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings.") .  
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dealerships. For example, in 20 1 2 , the 33 largest dealer groups in the country 
each had revenues in excess of $ 1  billion, with the two largest groups showing 
revenues of about $ 1 5.7 and $ 1 3. 2  billion respectively, and an average of 
nearly 23 dealerships in the group. '43 The ten largest car dealer networks in 
America have combined revenues of over $80 billion, which puts them at 
roughly the GDP of the entire country of Croatia. ' 44 The 1 ooth largest dealer 
group's annual revenues still exceed $300 million.'45 Even putting aside the 
impact of large group ownership, individual dealership revenues averaged 
$6. 1 million in 2 0 1 3 ,  with a net pre-tax profit of over $ 1  million. • 46 The 
economies of scale from this organization of capital may help the dealers meet 
the heavy regulatory burden under which they ostensibly labor, but it surely 
disqualifies any argument that dealers should be favored as small businesses 
as a general matter. • 47 
IV. THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE TESLA WARS 
A. LOCHNER 'S LONG SHADOW AND THE FRAIL TY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Stripped of their frail efforts to transform unequivocal dealer protection 
laws into consumer protection provisions, and unable to rely on the original 
unequal bargaining power argument since pure direct distribution involves 
no manufacturer-dealer contract, the dealers are exposed as nakedly seeking 
protection from competition. One need not fault the dealers for promoting 
the original franchise protection statutes to understand their current 
resistance to direct distribution as another chapter in the long story of crony 
capitalism. Dealer distribution is deeply engrained as the model, a habit of 
mind for manufacturers, consumers, and dealers alike. Never mind that the 
economic conditions of the market and relevant technologies have 
completely shifted over the last half century. The dealers see direct 
distribution as a mortal threat and the existing laws as their property, their 
constitutional charter. 
There is little doubt that the use of dealer franchise laws to block pure 
direct distribution is naked protectionism from competition for the benefit of 
car dealers. I will take it for granted that such a use of law should be curtailed. 
But it is a long step from that realization to obtaining relief from the judiciary. 
In the post-Lochner world, judges are shy about policing even blatant crony 
capitalism because assuming that role would often involve them in making 
1 43. WARDSAUTO DEALER Bus., WARDSAUTO: MEGA DEALER 1 00, at 22-25 (2013) , http:// 
wardsauto.com/site-files/wardsauto.com/files/uploads/ 20 1 3/ 04/UsaDeo2_20 1 3.pdf. 
1 4+ Id.; The World Factbook, CENT. INTEL IGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/ rankorder / 2001 rank.html (last visited Nov. 1 4, 2015) . 
1 45. WARDSAUTO DEALER BUS., supra note 1 43,  at 24-25. 
1 46. NADA, NADADATA: ANNUAL FINANCIAL PROFILE OF AMERICA'S FRANCHISED NEW-CAR 
DEALERSHIPS 3 (2014),  https://www.nada.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2 1474839497. 
1 47. See supra Part lll.B.3. 
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socio-economic judgments that would usurp the will of the democratically 
accountable branches of government. The doors of judicial relief are ajar, but 
barely. 
Antitrust law would seem an obvious instrument, but it is unavailable 
because of the Parker state action doctrine, which permits states to enact even 
nakedly anticompetitive legislation so long as the anticompetitive policy is 
clearly and affirmatively expressed as state policy and actively supervised by 
the state. 148 The Parker doctrine arose immediately in the wake of the Supreme 
Court's rejection of Lochnerism and reflected a resolve by the Court not to 
reinstate economic substantive due process under the mantle of the federal 
antitrust laws. 149 
That leaves constitutional doctrines, in particular the Dormant or 
Negative Commerce Clause and Equal Protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As noted earlier, Ford lost both challenges to Texas' direct 
distribution ban in the Fifth Circuit. 1 5° Dormant Commerce Clause challenges 
can succeed either by demonstrating unjustified discrimination against out­
of-state commerce or that "the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to .the putative local benefits." 15 1  The Fifth Circuit 
court reasoned that there was no discrimination against interstate commerce, 
since all car manufacturers, wherever domiciled, were similarly prohibited 
from engaging in direct distribution. 1s2 It also rejected Ford's balancing-test 
argument, finding that even if direct distribution would produce efficiencies 
for the benefit of consumers, a statute that curtailed efficiencies did not 
impose "a constitutional burden." 153 The state's asserted justifications for 
prohibiting direct distribution-"to prevent vertically integrated companies 
from taking advantage of their incongruous market position and ' to prevent 
frauds, unfair practices, discrimination, impositions, and other abuses of our 
1 48.  Parker v. Brown, 3 1 7  U.S. 34 1 ,  352 ( 1 943); see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-04 ( 1 980). 
1 49·  See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political 
Process, 96 YALE LJ. 486, 500 ( 1 987) ("Having only just determined not to use the Constitution 
in that manner, the Court was not about to resurrect Lochner in the garb of the Sherman Act.") ; 
Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: &jlections on Parker v. Brown, 7 5 CO LUM. L. 
REV. 328, 330-34 ( 1 975) (explaining the Court's decision in Parker through the lens of anti­
Lochner sentiment) . 
1 50. See supra notes 89-g2 and accompanying text. 
1 5 1 .  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 ,  3 3 1  ( 1 979) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
397 U.S. 1 37, 1 42 ( 1970) ). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AllfERICfu'\I CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1 03 1 ,  1057 (3d ed. 2000) . 
1 5 2 .  Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 2 64 F.3d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 200 1 )  ("It is 
irrelevant [under the Texas statute] whether Ford, as a manufacturer, is domiciled in Texas or 
Michigan. In either circumstance, it is similarly prohibited from engaging in retail automobile 
sales in Texas."). The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Corp. 
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 1 1 7 ( 1 978) ,  which upheld a Maryland statute prohibiting oil 
producers or refiners from operating retail service stations in the state. See id. at 500-0 1 .  
1 53.  Id. at 503. 
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citizens"'-were legitimate interests supporting the statute's 
constitutionality. 154 The court rejected Ford's Equal Protection Clause 
challenge for the same reason, finding that the direct sales prohibition bore 
"a reasonable relationship to the State's  legitimate purpose in controlling the 
[automobile] retail market. " 1 55 
Despite the Ford precedent, there are glimmers of hope for a challenge 
to bans on pure direct distribution. None of the unfair bargaining power 
arguments that have proven successful in upholding dealer protection laws1s6 
have any purchase as to manufacturers that avoid dealers altogether. And 
should the mantra of "frauds, unfair practices, discrimination, impositions, 
and other abuses [of our] citizens"1 s1 require affirmative proof as opposed to 
mumbo-jumbo assertion, the dealers will find themselves in constitutional 
trouble for all of the reasons explored in Part III. 
The success of any such challenge hinges on the current valence of the 
judiciary's post-Lochner resolution not to kick the tires on a state's purported 
justifications for nakedly protectionist regulations. There is little hope for 
meaningful judicial review if the courts refuse to invalidate a protectionist law 
on rational basis grounds "if there is any conceivable state of facts which would 
support it," whether or not that actual state of facts exists, has been asserted 
by the state, or has support in the record. 1s8 But if the courts demand more­
actual empirical support, even if contestable, and logical consistency-then 
the direct distribution bans will be susceptible to challenge. 
In the last decade, the federal appellate courts have begun to require 
more than boilerplate assertion from states defending statutes that seem, at 
first blush, nakedly protectionist. For example, the Fourth Circuit invoked the 
Negative Commerce Clause in striking down a Virginia statute granting 
motorcycle dealers protest rights whenever a franchising manufacturer 
opened a new dealership in the Commonwealth, even outside the dealers' 
geographic market area. •sg The purpose of the statute was plainly to grant 
dealers the power to exact concessions from manufacturers, but the 
Commonwealth tried to justify it as preventing dealer "oversaturation." 160 
Although paying lip service to the general principle that courts should rarely 
cast doubt on "a statute 's putative benefits," the court nonetheless pushed 
1 54. Id. 
1 55.  Id. at  510 (alteration in original ) .  
1 56. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 ( 1 978) (upholding dealer 
franchise laws intended to protect dealers from the superior bargaining power of manufacturers). 
1 57. See, e.g. ,  ARK. MOTOR VEHICLE COMM'N, SYNOPSIS (n.d.) , http://www.amvc.arkansas. 
gov/pdf/amvc_sum.pdf. 
1 58.  Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 ( 1 937) ;  see also Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 ( 1 955) . 
1 59. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.Jim's Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2005 ) .  
1 60. Jd. at 570-7 1 .  
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back sharply on the "putative benefits," finding them ill-served by the 
statute. 161 
Other courts have shown similar teeth-what Judge Ginsburg has called 
"rational basis with economic bite"-in invalidating protectionist legislation 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 162 The two leading cases both involve state 
restnct10ns that essentially granted funeral homes protection from 
competition in casket sales. 163 If the question were whether such 
protectionism could have some conceivabl,e rational basis other than naked 
transfers of wealth, 1 64 the answer would have to be yes. Yet, in striking down 
those statutes, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits demanded more than the 
conceivable .  Against a backdrop principle that "protecting a discrete interest 
group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental 
purpose," 1 6s the courts scrutinized the states' asserted purposes for empirical 
support and logical consistency and, finding those qualities wanting, 
invalidated the statutes. The "protecting a discrete interest group from 
economic competition" principle is not your grandfather's rational basis 
review. 166 It articulates a distinct and testable limit on the exercise of the state's  
police powers that requires more justification by the state than invitations to 
armchair imagination. 
If this principle crystallizes as a distinct mode of constitutional analysis, 
the restrictions on pure direct distribution should be in serious trouble. A 
broad coalition of 72  distinguished economists and law professors recently 
penned an open letter calling the direct distribution ban "protectionism for 
auto dealers, pure and simple." 167 If that claim is correct, as argued in Part III, 
the direct distribution bans would fail rational basis scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Still, Lochnels shadow looms large, and the model federal judge resists a 
return to the days of economic substantive due process. Soberly assessing the 
odds, Tesla has thus far shied away from provoking a constitutional challenge. 
For now, its stronger hand lies in the court of popular opinion and state 
legislatures. 
1 6 1 .  Id. 
1 62.  See generally Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 7. 
1 63. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 7 1 2  F.3d 2 1 5  (5th Cir. 2013) ;  Craigmiles v. Giles, 3 1 2  F.3d 
220 (6th Cir. 2002) .  
1 64. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the OmstitutWn, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 689, l 695--g6 
( 1 984) (defining naked transfers of wealth as government resource redistribution absent justification 
by an articulated public value). 
1 65. Craigmiles, 3 1 2  F.3d at 224; see also Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n . 15  (9th Cir. 
2008) ("We conclude that mere economic protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is 
irrational with respect to determining if a classification smvives rational basis review.") .  
1 66. Craigmiles, 3 1 2  F.3d at 2 24. 
1 67. Letter from Int'! Ctr. for Law & Econs. to Chris Christie, Governor of NJ. 1 (Mar. 26, 
20 1 4) ,  http:/ /www.laweconcenter.org/images/articles/tesla_letter _icle.pdf. 
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In conventional public choice theoretic terms, economic special interests 
are able to capture the political process and extract rents because of collective 
action problems: the concentrated benefits to the special interests induce the 
expenditure of political resources up to the value of the rents, whereas the 
diffuse nature of the harm to consumers, taxpayers, or other wide social 
groups impede mobilization of an effective response. 1 68 The history of direct 
distribution regulation reflects this pattern. The Big Three gave up on waging 
any kind of serious fight against dealer protectionism decades ago, and since 
then, the car industry as a whole has largely acquiesced. Although consumers 
bear the brunt of the protectionism, the consumer interest is too fragmented 
and dispersed to be easily mobilized. It has taken entry by a well-capitalized 
firm wielding a new technology and with sufficient disincentives to acquiesce 
in the industry's longstanding settlement to break open a fight with the 
dealers. 
The political dynamics of the Tesla wars make for strange bedfellows. The 
car dealers lean overwhelmingly Republican, 169 which may help to explain 
their considerable leverage in Republican-dominated state legislatures. On 
principle, however, dealer protectionism sits uneasily in the Republican 
stable. The Tesla wars have seen Republican Governors like Chris Christie, 
Rick Perry, and Rick Snyder chided for anti-free-market policies by news 
sources such as the National Review11° and the Wall Streetjournal. 17 1  Meanwhile, 
sensing the opportunity to bolster his free-market credentials, another 
potential 2016 Republican Presidential nominee, Florida Senator Marco 
Rubio, took to CNBC to blast New Jersey's anti-Tesla measures. 1 72 
The pro-direct distribution themes resonate with the economic 
libertarianism of the right, but also with consumer protection and 
environmentalist themes usually associated with the left. The senior staff 
1 68. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. 
1 69. Josh Barro, Republicans Are Only Sometimes the Party of Uber, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8 ,  2014) ,  
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2014/ 1 1 I09/ upshot/ republicans-are-only-sometimes-the-party-of-uber. 
html?_r=o&abt=ooo2&abg=1 ;  Nate Silver, News Flash: Car Dealers Are Republicans (It 's Called a 
Control Group, People) , FIVETHIRlYEIGHT: POL. (May 27, 2009, 10:50 PM), http://fivethirtyeight. 
com/features/news-flash-car-dealers-are-republicans. 
1 70. Jim Geraghty, Rick Perry on the Effort to Tum Texas Blue, NAT'L REV.: CORNER (Mar. 7, 
2014, 1 :44 PM) ,  http:/ /www.nationalreview.com/ corner/ 372877 /rick-perry-effort-turn-texas­
bluejim-geraghty. 
1 7 1 . Rick Snyder Drives Off the Road: Michigan 's Pro-Market Governor Embraces the Car Dealer Cartel, 
WALL STREET ]. (Oct. 24, 2014, T 1 8  PM), http:/ /www. sj.com/articles/ rick-snyder-drives-off­
the-road-1 4 1 4 1 92688; see a/,so Matt Friedman, Christie Says Tesla Criticism Is 'Complete Crap, 'NJ.COM 
Uuly 1 6, 20 1 4, 3:43 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/07/christie_calls_tesla_ 
criticism_complete_crap.html ("I don't  like the law either. I didn't vote for it. I didn't sign it. But 
I don't get to just ignore the laws I don't like." (quoting Governor Chris Christie) ) .  
1 72 .  Jeff Morganteen, Sen Rubio: Allow Tesla to Sell Direct to Consumers, CNBC (Mar. 25, 2014, 
9: 1 8  AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/ 1 0 1 522333. 
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leadership of the Obama FTC have come out publicly in support of direct 
distribution on pro-consumer grounds. 1 73 A wide range of academics from 
across the political spectrum have signed pro-Tesla open letters advocating 
direct distribution. ' 74 Meanwhile, an unusual coalition of free market, 
environmentalist, pro-consumer, and pro-technology groups, including such 
strange bedfellows as the Institute for Justice, Americans for Prosperity, 
Environment America, the Sierra Club, Consumer Action, and the Consumer 
Federation of America, have joined an open letter calling on states to allow 
direct distribution of automobiles. '75 
The Tesla wars offer an opportunity to re-introduce and re-explain the 
problematics of economic protectionism and special interest capture, 
particularly to those of the environmentally conscious, "on demand," and 
technology-savvy younger generations accustomed to being able to buy 
anything over the Internet. The issue's pan-ideological appeal provides 
opportunity for politicians of any stripe to burnish their credentials across 
traditional partisan lines: conservative Republicans can invoke dealer 
protection as evidence that violation of free market principles interferes with 
carbon emission reduction and harms consumers' pocketbooks; liberal 
Democrats can explain how e nhanced competition can create positive 
environmental, technological, and consumer welfare effects. Despite its 
political perils, 1 76 direct distribution is sitting on a silver platter, waiting for 
opportunistic paladins on either side of the political spectrum. 
Public choice theory has long been suspected of serving as a covert anti­
regulatory tool of the right. ' 77 The Tesla wars offer an opportunity to retell 
1 73. Andy Cavil, Debbie Feinstein & Marty Gaynor, Who Decides H(JUJ Consumers Shap?, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (Apr. 24, 2014, 1 1 :00 AM), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition­
matters/ 201 4/ 04/who-decides-how-consumers-should-shop. 
1 7  4. See supra note 1 6 7  and accompanying text. 
1 75.  Letter from Am. Antitrust Inst. et al. to State Government Leaders (Feb. 1 6, 2015) ,  
http://www2.itif.org/ 201 5-tesla-big-ten t-letter.pdf; see also Dana Hull, Koch Brothers, Sierra Club join 
Tesla in Fight with Dealers, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 1 7, 2015, 1 0: 1 4  AM), http:/ /www.bloomberg. 
com/ news/ articles/ 201 5-02-1 7 /koch-brothers-sierra-clubjoin-tesla-in-fight-with-<lealers. 
I 76. Apart from statements by the independent FTC, the Obama administration has thus far 
declined to weigh in. In response to a pro-Tesla petition, the Obama White House issued a tepid 
statement observing that "regulating auto sales are issues that have traditionally sat with lawmakers at 
the state level." Dan Utech, Response to We the People Petition on Tesla Motors, WHITE HOUSE (July 1 1 , 
2014), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/response-we-people-petition-tesla-motors. 
1 77. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common 
Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 87 5, 884 ( 1 99 1 )  ("Conservatives who are 
suspicious of government have foun d  in public choice a congenial catalogue of political 
misdemeanors . . .  ."); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 1 99, 204 ( 1 988) (offering a critical 
perspective on "right-wing public choice literature") ;  Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of National 
Government: Justice Stevens s Stand Against judicial Subversion of Progressive Laws and Lawmaking, 1 06 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 769, 77fr77 ( 20 1 2) (referring to "conservative academics' jaundiced 'public choice theory' 
perspective on modem democratic pluralist institutions") ;  Mark V. Tushnet, Does Constitutional 
Theory Matter?: A Comment, 65 TEX. L. REV. 777, 782-83 n . 1 5  ( 1 987) ("The entire literature 
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the story: long-entrenched technologies and interests rely on the inertial pull 
of decades-old regulatory captures to subvert the emergence of new 
technologies capable of vastly improving consumer welfare, putting clean cars 
on the streets, and reducing carbon emissions and dependence on foreign 
oil. Consumers and voters are slow to understand and react because of 
informational asymmetries and the diffuse and non-obvious nature of their 
injury. Courts are reluctant to second-guess the legislative decisions on 
constitutional grounds, fearing a return to an era of judicial activism on socio­
economic matters. Until motivated coalitions of public interest groups 
mobilize to fight back, crony capitalism will continue to exert a strong inertial 
force. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the familiar Schumpeterian story, brutal industrial contest between 
old and new technologies is the "essential fact" about capitalist economic 
organization: 1 18 that incumbent technologies will resist the new entrants by 
erecting and bolstering legal and regulatory entry barriers should be assumed, 
and that they will often be successful in at least slowing the new technology's 
expected momentum. The current alliance of manufacturers and dealers of 
internal combustion vehicles against the onslaught of EVs is hardly the first 
such instance in the history of the American transportation industry. For 
example, in the 1 920s, the American Horse Association mobilized to block 
the spread of internal combustion technologies by lobbying for laws against 
heavy trucks on public roads and granting horses special legal status in urban 
areas. ' 79 
The Tesla wars are important for the issues directly at stake-the 
proliferation of EV technology and all of its associated implications for the 
environment, energy policy, and automotive innovation.  They are also 
significant as a contemporary, sharply definable, and ideologically mixed 
paradigm of special interest capture and crony capitalism. 
on public choice can be seen to support a right-wing version of representation-reinforcing 
review . . . .  ") ;  cf. D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, l 09 MICH. L. 
REV. 1 029, 1 03 1  (20 1 1 )  (reviewing MAxWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE 
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009) ) (arguing that the view of public choice theory as a 
right-wing tool is misguided while pointing to a number of left-leaning scholars who employ 
public choice analysis) . 
1 78.  JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 ( 2d ed.  1942) .  
1 79. Alan L. Olmstead & Paul W. Rhode, The Agricultural Mechanization Controversy of the 
lnterwar Years, 68 AGRIC. HIST. Soc'Y 35, 40-4 1 ( 1 994) . 

